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IN THE SUPREME COURI' 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID K. ROBINSON, 
a Utah Professional Corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. case No. 
MORRIS MYERS, 16153 
Defendant and Appellant. 
APPELLANT Is BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Defendant 1 s rrotion to vacate judgrrent by default 
under Rule 60 (b), U.R.C.P. 
DISPOSITION IN !.a'VER COURT 
Defendant 1 s rrotion to vacate denied. 
RELIEF SOu;HT ON APPEAL 
Reversal of the order denying defendant 1 s rrotion to vacate and re-
mand with directions that proper proof be heard by the trial court on 
the rrerits of the rrotion to dismiss under Rule 12 (b) (6), u .R.C.P.; or, 
alternatively, that the rrotion be denied without prejudice to the right 
of defendant to raise the subject matter thereof by an answer for final 
detennination at trial of the cause upcn its rrerits. 
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STATEMENT OF FACI'S 
Plaintiff's claim is for attorney's fees and expenses. The sum-
mons and canplaint were served April 20, 1978 (Record, 7, 8). The 
exhibits attached to the pleadings disclose that Robinson and Guyon, 
and Robinson, Guyon, Surrrrerhays and Barnes, are the real parties in 
interest (Record, 4-6, ll-13). Also, the records of Utah's Lieu-
tenant Governor/Secretary of State disclose that between July 20, 1977, 
and August 1, 1978, there was no professional corporation in Utah, 
named "David K. Robinson, a Utah Professional Corporation," the name 
in which this action is prosecuted (Record, 25-26, 30, 33). 
The real party in interest and capacity to sue defenses were 
tendered by deferrlant by motion to dismiss under Rule 12 (b) (6) which 
was served by mail on May 11, 1978 (Record, 18, 26, 33, 47). The pur-
pose of the motion, as v.IE!ll as defendant's agreerrent to an amendrrent 
and intention to counterclaim, were camn.micated to David K. Robinson 
by letter dated May 11, 1978 (Record, 26, 40). On May 16, 1978, 
Robinson mailed (served) amended canplaint to defendant and enclosed a 
stipulation to amend (Record, 9-13, 14, 36, 46). The amended canplaint 
did not cure the violations of Rule 17, U.R.C.P. which were the basis 
of defendant's motion to dismiss. Defendant so informed Robinson and 
executed the stipulation to amend on May 26, 1978 (Record, 14, 26-27). 
No amended canplaint curing the violations of Rule 17 was thereafter 
forthcaning (Record, 27) and on June 27, 1978, defendant filed his mo-
tion to dismiss with the court (Record, 18) . 
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On June 19, 1978, Judgment by Default was entered and filed 
(Record, 17). Defendant first learned of the judgment on October l7, 
1978 (Record, 25), and on October 19, 1978, rroved the court to set it 
aside (Record, 22-36). In his Counter-Affidavit (Record, 39-46) Robin-
son stated: 
"I deny receiving a copy of the Defendant 1 s Motion 
to Dismiss by mail and dated May ll, 1978 as alleged 
by the Defendant. My first knowledge of said motion 
was as a result of my visit to the Court on the day 
and date when the Default Judgment was taken against 
Mr. Myers." (Record, 40) 
Fran this it must be inferred (falsa in uno, falsa in anriibus) that 
Robinson 1 s first knowledge of the motion to dismiss carre when he re-
ceived it in the mail a day or so after May ll, 1978, the date it was 
served. Knowledge of the rrotion, as he alleges, could not have been 
first acquired from his visit to the court on June 19, 1978, the date 
of the judgment, because the motion was not filed until June 27, 1978 
(Record, 18) . 
Robinson further alleged in his Counter-Affidavit that: 
"It was the name of Robinson and Guyon Under which the 
first suit was filed and prior to the arrended canplaint." 
(Record, 41) ! ! 
ARGUMENT 
Points l, 2 and 3, respectively, the default was not properly entered, 
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as a matter of law defendant is entitled to have the default judgment va-
cated, and, the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant's 
motion to vacate, argued together. 
The real party in interest at the beginning of the action must prose-
cute it in his own name (Wilson v. Kiesel, 9 U. 397, 35 P. 488). The de-
fendant has the right to have a cause of action prosecuted by the real 
party in interest so that the judgment will preclude any action on the 
same demand by another, and so that the defendant will be pennitted to 
assert all defenses or counterclaims available against the real owner 
of the cause (Rule 17, U.R.C.P.; Shaw v. Jeppson, 121 u. 155, 239 P. 2d 
745). 
Real party in interest and capacity to sue objections are properly 
raised by a U.R.C.P. Rule 12 motion to dismiss that the canplaint fails 
to state a claim (Pace v. General Electric Co., (W. D. Pa. 1972) 55 F.R.D. 
215, 16 FRServ. 2d 529; Par. 17.15-l., 3A Moore's Federal Practice; 
Klebano.v v. New York Produce Exchange, (CA2 1965) 344 F2d 294, 9 FRServ. 
2d l7b.3, Case l; Weiner v. Winters, (D.C.N.Y. 1970) 50 F.R.D. 306; 
Par. l2.07(a), 2A Moore's Federal Practice). 
Rule 12 (a) provides that the service of such a motion results in a 
postponement of the ti.m= of serving an a.n.swer, and, consequently, no 
default results pending disposition of the motion. Rule 12 only requires 
service of the motion and U.R.C.P. Rule 5 provides that service by mail 
is canplete on mailing. Non-receipt of the paper does not affect the 
validity of the service (Pars. 5.07, 5.09, 2 Moore's Federal Practice; 
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Freed v. Plastic Packaging Materials, Inc., (E.D. Pa. 1975) 66 F.R.D. 
550, 20 FRServ. 2d 243). 
Since, under this record, it is undisputed that a Rule 12 motion 
to dismiss had teen served thus altering the time for responsive plead-
ing as provided by Rule 12 (a), no default existed, and the question is 
not, as the lower court perceived it in denying the motion to vacate, 
whether a meritorious defense existed but whether the default was 
properly entered (Wilver v. Fisher, (lOCCA 1967, 387 F. 2d 66). The 
rrotion, even if insufficient in form to raise the objection intended, 
would, nevertheless, be sufficient to prevent default sc that the de-
fault in this case was illegal and irregul,ar (Felt v. Felt, 50 U. 364, 
167 P. 835). There being no default, the judgment was not properly 
entered and defendant is entitled to relief fran the default judgment 
on this basis alone. It thus becares unnecessary for argument on, or the 
court to consider or speculate as to whether Robinson's conduct derron-
strated sarething short of good faith in prosecuting this action to the 
point of obtaining a default judgment against the defendant he knew was 
not in default (15 ALR Fed. 193, 269 Sec. 18) . 
Manifest injustice would result fran permitting the default judg-
ment to stand. Early on in these proceedings Robinscn was informed of 
defendant's intention to assert a counterclaim and that it was neces-
sary that the action be prosecuted in the name of the real party in 
interest with capacity to sue (Record, 26, 40). If the default judgment 
is permitted to stand defendant may be precluded fran asserting his claim, 
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i.e., a claim for professional negligence may constitute a ccmpulsor1 
counterclaim to plaintiff's suit for compensation and costs expended for 
services in the performance of which the negligence is claimed, or, on 
the basis of res judicata if the claim should have been raised (Lind-
quist v. Quinones, (D.C.V.I. 1978) 79 F.R.D. 158). 
CONCWSION 
Defendant's rrotion was filed pursuant to U.R.C.P. Rule 60(b) 
which provides in pertinent party that "on rrotion and upon such tenns 
as are just, the court may in furtherance of justice relieve a party ... 
from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: 
.•... (7) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the 
judgment." Adequate and legal reasons supporting the granting of the 
rrotion are present; reversal of the lower court's order denying the 
rrotion, in justice, is required. 
Respectfully subnitted, 
Mo=is Myers 
1395 Chandler Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Defendant and Appellant 
6 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
